CIA & the Nuclear Black Market: A Case Study24/10/2011 06:40
Watch the full video here
The AQ Khan nuclear network was first introduced to the public in early 2004, with Abdul Qadeer Khan’s dramatic televised confession to the Pakistani public that he had participated in selling nuclear technology, including bomb-making designs and equipment, to countries including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Right from the beginning, the sensational nature of the network and its eventual discovery, a tale of international intrigue and shadowy spy craft, seemed tailor-made for headline-grabbing reports, or sensationalistic BBC docudramas.
As is typical with these events, a popular understanding has emerged around the early reporting on the subject, one that suggests that Dr. Khan was working essentially off the radar and out of sight of the intelligence agencies whose very existence is predicated on identifying such threats long before they develop.
Inevitably, however, as happens every time that an intelligence operation leads to some catastrophic result, the “incompetence theory” is trotted out as a way to explain what happened. In the Khan case, it is argued that the CIA, despite infesting every layer of this plot, somehow remained completely oblivious to Khan’s efforts to proliferate these weapons to North Korea, Iran, and Libya until it was already too late.
This is our EyeOpener Report by James Corbett, presenting the documented but under-reported facts and intrigues on AQ Khan’s nuclear network, the CIA’s knowledge and surveillance of the network from its very inception, and the collaborative efforts by the CIA and certain US politicians to fund, protect and further the network’s nuclear black-market activities and expansion.