Why Are the Fed and SEC Keeping Wall Street’s Secrets?04/04/2012 18:47
Getting what should be public information about major Wall Street firms can be maddeningly difficult.
Bloomberg News discovered this in its ultimately successful effort to get information on the $1.2 trillion in “secret loans” the Fed doled out during the financial crisis. And I’ve had no small experience of it myself.
I was hoping to find, among other nuggets, details of enforcement actions, or settlements that were reached where the firms “neither admitted nor denied” guilt, or other documentary evidence of the coziness that has for too long existed between Wall Street and Washington.
Sadly, getting this information in anything like a timely basis -- say, before my books were finished and published -- has been nearly impossible. At first, when I asked the SEC about documents related to Lazard’s role in the Hartford-Mediobanca scandal starting in 1968 and ending in 1981, the agency told me it could not release the information. When I reminded the FOIA administrator that the SEC had already released the information, years before, to another journalist, the agency dug up the 40 boxes of unindexed, unorganized documents and invited me to a warehouse in Pennsylvania to take a look. After an hour or so, the clerk asked me if I was done with my review. (Eventually, I persuaded the SEC to ship the boxes -- at my expense -- to its office in Manhattan, where I spent months poring over them.)
But that bit of beginner’s luck turned out to be a fluke. To this day, the SEC has given me nothing -- zilch, nada -- about Bear Stearns or Goldman Sachs. After the Lazard book was published, the State Department sent me a thin file that was, supposedly, what it had in its possession about Felix Rohatyn’s three years as the U.S. ambassador to France. I opened the envelope and discovered that most of the 10 or so pages had been redacted.
Last December, nearly nine months after my Goldman book was published, I received an official-looking package from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Slapped on the outside of the envelope was a bright orange sticker about keeping the contents -- a computer disk -- away from “magnets and electric motors” and, of course, the warning “Do Not X- Ray.” This, I suspected, was my long-awaited document file about Goldman’s dealings with the Federal Reserve in the days leading up to Sept. 22, 2008, when it, along with Morgan Stanley, had the good fortune to be allowed to become a bank holding company with lifesaving unlimited access to short-term funding.
I was hoping to discover how that whole thing went down at the time, and how Goldman and Morgan Stanley got the Fed’s blessing but Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. did not. Also I was interested in Goldman’s interactions with the Fed since that fateful moment. My hopes were raised further when I heard from people at the firm that Goldman had reviewed the contents of what was being sent to me and that its executives seemed worried about it.
No such luck. On the disk was nothing more than a bunch of obscure -- but publicly available -- Federal Reserve documents about the details of Goldman’s assets and liabilities on a quarterly and annual basis, everything from the kinds of loans the firm had been making to the tenor of its derivatives book to whether the real-estate loans it owns were backed by commercial properties or residential properties.